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CHILD SUPPORT: HIS, HER, OR THEIR
RESPONSIBILITY?
Parental child support obligations have become a matter of increasing
public concern, with the primary emphasis to date focused upon the
problem of locating an absent parent and forcing him or her to
contribute support monies.' Much less attention has been directed to
the underlying questions of the nature and extent of each parent's sup-
port duty and the relative parental support obligations.' In the United
States, the traditional common law rule for allocating support duties
between the parents is two-fold. The father's support obligation is pri-
mary, while that of the mother is secondary, arising only upon the death
or incapacity of the father.3
At one time Illinois clearly followed the traditional rule of primary
and secondary obligations.4 Recently, however, two Illinois appellate
courts have concluded that the traditional rules no longer apply. Each
court has held that parents are jointly and severally5 obligated to sup-
1. See, e.g., Zumbrun & Parslow, Absent Parent Child Support: The California
Experience, 8 FAMILY L.Q. 329 (1974); Gorner, The Child Support Dilemma, Chicago
Tribune, Sept. 22, 1975, §3, at 1, col. 1, continued at Sept. 23, 1975, §3, at 1, col. 4; Sept.
24, 1975, §3, at 1, col. 1; Sept. 25, 1975, §3, at 3, col. 1. The major state legislation to
date has been the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the Illinois
version of which appears in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§101-42 (1975). Recently-enacted
federal legislation provides for the assignment of welfare recipients' child support claims
to the state for collection, federal incentive payments to states which set up collection
programs meeting specified criteria, and a parent locator system which is also available
to non-welfare recipients. See 42 U.S.C. §§651-60 (Supp. IV, 1974).
2. The term "relative parental support obligations," as used herein, refers to each
parent's individual obligation, as related to that of the other parent.
3. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 187-88, 488-89 (1968).
In 1968, 44 states and the District of Columbia adhered to the rule of primary/secondary
obligations. United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, Parental Rights and
Duties, Including Guardianship, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/474/Rev. 1 at 51 (1968).
4. Plaster v. Plaster, 47 Ill. 290 (1868), is the leading Illinois case stating this rule.
Accord, Harding v. Harding, 180 Ill. 481, 54 N.E. 587 (1899); Johnson v. Johnson, 239
Ill.App. 417 (1st Dist. 1926); Bishop v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 217 Ill.App. 112
(1st Dist. 1920); Parkinson v. Parkinson, 116 Ill.App. 112 (4th Dist. 1904). The pri-
mary/secondary distinction was later codified in the Uniform Support of Dependents Law,
Law of July 25, 1949, §3, [1949] Ill. Laws 1192-93. Section 3 of the 1949 session laws was
codified as section 52 of chapter 68 and will hereinafter be referred to as section 52. In
1969, the legislature enacted the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
now ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§101-42 (1975), at which time it repealed the entire 1949 Act
including section 52. P.A. 76-1090 (Aug. 28, 1969). However, the 1969 Act did not include
a section dealing with support obligations, and no other statute is exactly on point.
5. For a more complete discussion of this term and problems associated with applying
it to the relative parental support obligations, see notes 46-48 and accompanying text
infra.
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port their children, and that each parent's contribution should be based
upon his or her ability to pay.' In Plant v. Plant,7 the court denied a
mother any retroactive allowance for support rendered after issuance of
a separate maintenance decree, but during a period when the father was
incapacitated and without assets.' Hursh v. Hursh overturned a trial
court ruling that a divorced mother, who was earning more than the
father who had custody, did not have to contribute any future child
support monies.'0 This Comment will analyze and explain these two
decisions and the new joint and several support obligation of Illinois
parents."
Plant AND Hursh
Both the Plant and Hursh opinions examined several statutes before
turning to prior judicial decisions concerning child support duties. The
6. Plant v. Plant, 20 Ill. App.3d 5, 312 N.E.2d 847 (5th Dist. 1974); Hursh v. Hursh, 26
Ill.App.3d 947, 326 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1975).
7. 20 Ill.App.3d 5, 312 N.E.2d 847 (5th Dist. 1974).
8. The 1967 separate maintenance decree awarded the mother custody, but made no
provision for support. The father was without assets, unemployed, and hospitalized for
alcoholism. Mrs. Plant supported the child thereafter, at a cost of approximately $3,100
per year. In 1972, the father inherited $40,000, shortly after which he was declared incom-
petent and a conservator of his estate was appointed. The mother then filed a petition
seeking future support payments of $40 per week, and a recovery of $5,200, representing
one-half of the past support expenses. The trial court granted future support of $35 per
week, a total of $1,820 per year, but denied recovery for any of the past support expenses.
The only issue on appeal was the denial of past support.
9. 26 Ill.App.3d 947, 326 N.E.2d 95 (1st Dist. 1975).
10. At the time of the Hursh divorce, the mother was given custody of the child and
the father was ordered to contribute $50 per week as child support. Mr. Hursh obtained
custody in 1973 and shortly thereafter petitioned the court for an order directing his ex-
wife to contribute an equitable amount for child support. Upon learning that Mr. Hursh
earned approximately $16,000 per year, the trial judge denied the petition. Although
further evidence showing that Mrs. Hursh earned almost $20,000 per year was introduced,
the judge persisted in the denial, saying "You take it up to the Appellate Court and let
them prove that the wife should contribute if she is making more money." Id. at 949, 952,
326 N.E.2d at 96-97, 98. The appellate court found the statement indicative of the trial
court's position and reproduced it twice in the opinion.
11. Both Plant and Hursh were concerned with the civil support obligations of parents,
and this Comment will deal only with the duties imposed by civil law. Nevertheless, the
criminal law is also designed to enforce minimal parental support duties. See criminal
statutes listed in notes 23 and 27 infra. The authorities agree that enforcing civil support
obligations, which are designed to obtain needed parental support, is preferable to impos-
ing criminal sanctions which are designed to punish parents for non-support. See, e.g.,
CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 19 (1968), reprinted at Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess., 164 (1970); Zumbrun & Parslow, supra note 1, at 332.
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Hursh court adopted the "plain meaning"" approach to statutory inter-
pretation. Upon examination of the divorce'" and temporary support'4
statutes, the court found references to "parties" and "parents" in the
plural. Thus, the statutes mandated consideration of both parents' as-
sets. There was "no statutory justification for placing a greater burden
for the support of the children on the father than the mother. '"'5 The trial
court, which had based its denial of future support solely upon the
earnings of the father, had abused its discretion when it "failed to con-
sider the circumstances of all the parties as required by the statute. '"'
The statutory analysis in Hursh presents problems, however, because
the court went beyond the conclusion of abuse of discretion" to hold the
divorced parents jointly and severally liable for support. The statutes
were said to clearly treat both parents alike or equally.'" This is true
insofar as the statutes mandate consideration of both parents' assets.
However, the statutes, both on their face and viewed in their historical
context, do not relate to the proper allocation of the relative parental
support duties.'9 That question has been left to other statutes"0 or case
12. Courts taking this approach seek to arrive at the literal or obvious meaning of
statutory language. 2A C. DALLAS SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§46.01,
46.02 (4th ed. 1973). Sands criticizes some courts which claim to be applying this approach
when interpreting a statute, the meaning of which is not clear. Such criticism is not
applicable to Hursh. The only logical interpretation of the plural language used in the
statutes in question is that it refers to more than one person. See notes 13 and 14 infra.
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §19 (1975). It states in part: "When a divorce is decreed, the
court may make such order touching the . . . support of the children . . . as, from the
circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, shall be fit, reasonable and just
.... (emphasis added).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §14 (1975). It states in part: "The court may, ... during
the pendency of the suit . . . make such provision for the education and maintenance of
the child or children . . . out of the property of either or both of its parents as equity may
require. ... (emphasis added). This statute was not applicable to the facts of Hursh
because the parties were already divorced. The court probably included it to show a
general legislative pattern requiring consideration of the assets of both parties in reaching
support allocation decisions.
15. 26 Ill.App.3d at 950, 326 N.E.2d at 97.
16. Id. at 952, 326 N.E.2d at 99.
17. It might be argued that the only holding in Hursh was that the trial court had
abused its discretion. That would seem sufficient to support the reversal and remand.
Nevertheless, the court clearly stated that there were two issues to be decided, the first
of which was whether divorced parents share financial responsibility for child support. Id.
at 948, 326 N.E.2d at 96. The court decided the responsibility issue before discussing abuse
of discretion.
18. Id. at 950, 326 N.E.2d at 97.
19. The provision governing child support was enacted in its present form in 1827 and
has not been changed. See Act Concerning Divorce, Law of June 1, 1827, §6, 11827] Il.
Laws 181-83. It was in effect throughout the period when the traditional pri-
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law." The legislative mandate to consider the assets of both parents can
be fulfilled regardless of whether the allocation of parental duties is
primary and secondary2 or joint and several. Thus, the statutes cited
in Hursh do not lead inexorably to the court's conclusion of joint and
several liability with contributions according to financial ability. There
remains an unexplained gap between the statutory support offered and
the conclusion which the court reached.
The statutory analysis in Plant suffers from a slightly different defect.
The court cited seven Illinois statutes23 as indicative of the fact that the
common law support rules had become outmoded.24 In effect, the Plant
mary/secondary distinction in support duties was the firmly established law of Illinois. See
note 4 supra. Yet now, the same language is used to support the Hursh conclusion of joint
and several parental obligations. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §19 (1975).
20. The only Illinois statute on point was Law of July 25, 1949, §3, [19491 Ill. Laws
1192-93 (repealed 1969), discussed'in note 4 supra. While the statute was in force, the
Attorney General of Illinois described it as containing the "general duties of support in
Illinois." 1962 Op. Arr'y GEN. 241. Because section 52 (formerly section 3) has been
repealed, no substitute has been enacted, and no other statute is directly on point, the
legislature has left the matter open for judicial consideration.
21. The only Illinois cases specifically on point are dated and the rule of primary and
secondary liability followed therein was rejected in both Plant and Hursh. See cases cited
in note 4 supra and discussion of more recent cases in notes 34-43 and accompanying text
infra.
22. One of the clearest examples of the consistency of the primary/secondary distinction
with a consideration of both parents' assets appears in the recent Missouri Dissolution of
Marriage Act. The child support section, Mo. ANN. STAT. §452.340 (Supp. 1976), lists six
factors to be considered in fixing the amount of awards. First on the list is "The father's
primary responsibility for support of his child." The financial resources of both the cus-
todial and non-custodial parent appear later in the list of factors to be considered.
23. The court, in reaching its decision, relied on ILL. REV. STAT. 1973. The citations to
ILL. REV. STAT. 1975 herein remain substantially the same.
The cited statutes may be divided into three categories. First are current statutes which
impose civil support duties on parents: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, §132 (1975) (parental right
to custody); id. ch. 23, §2-11 (legally responsible relatives in relation to public aid); id.
ch. 40, §19 (support in divorce); id. ch. 68, §15 (family expenses). The second category
consists of current statutes which impose criminal sanctions for non-support: id. ch. 23,
§2361 (misdemeanor of contributing to dependency or neglect of a child); id. ch. 68, §24
(non-support of children is a misdemeanor). Finally, the court cited two subsections of a
repealed statute which dealt with persons legally liable for support of dependents. See Law
of July 14, 1955, §3(a)(b), [19551 Ill. Laws 1999-2000 (repealed 1969). During the period
this section was in force, it was codified in chapter 68, §52.
24. The Plant opinion does not clearly identify what common law rule the court had in
mind. It referred to the "traditional view that support of a child is exclusively a husband's
obligation and that a wife's income, assets and ability to provide for a child are irrele-
vant." 20 Ill.App.3d at 8, 312 N.E.2d at 850. This was the earliest common law rule,
predating the primary/secondary distinction which is now the prevalent rule in the United
States. However, Illinois adopted the primary/secondary distinction in 1868, and the Plant
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court implied that the statutes were an expression of legislative desire
to modify the common law rules. There is, however, nothing in the
history of the cited statutory provisions to indicate that such was the
legislative intent." Instead, six of the statutes" are similar to the stat-
utes cited in Hursh. They simply do not deal with the proper allocation
of the relative parental support duties.2" Further, the remaining
statutory citation 8 lends no additional support to the court's conclusion
of joint and several liability with contributions according to ability. It
was to two subsections of a statute, since repealed, which codified the
common law rule of primary and secondary liability."9
opinion shows awareness of changes since that time. Therefore, this Comment assumes
that Plant rejected the primary/secondary distinction in support duties. If that is not so,
the Plant court was laboring under a grievous misconception and attempting to overturn
a common law rule which had not existed in Illinois for over 100 years.
25. The six current statutory provisions cited in note 23 supra were all originally en-
acted between 1827 and 1915. The Illinois legislature did not take any steps to remove
the common law disabilities of married women, including mothers, until 1861, when a
married woman was first allowed to hold and retain her separate property. An Act to
Protect Married Women in Their Separate Property, Law of Feb. 21, 1861, §1, [18611
Ill. Laws 143. The comprehensive Act of 1874, which equalized property rights between
spouses, remains in substantially similar form in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §§1-21 (1975).
However, by 1874 Illinois had adopted the primary/secondary distinction in support duties
and that distinction persisted unchallenged for some time after 1915. See cases cited in
note 4 supra.
26. See current statutes listed in note 23 supra.
27. There are other statutes, not cited in either Plant or Hursh, which also fall in this
category, including the following which impose civil support duties: ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
23, §10-2 (1975) (legally responsible relatives in relation to public aid); id. ch. 23, §5005.1
(liability for care furnished children by the Dept. of Children and Family Services); id.
ch. 37, §§701-14, 707-4 (liability for support under the Juvenile Ct. Act); id. ch. 68, §22
(support in separate maintenance); and id. ch. 106 /, §§52, 59, 59(a) (support of illegiti-
mate children). Id. ch. 23, §2359 (child abandonment as a felony), a criminal statute, also
applies to both parents.
28. Law of July 14, 1955, §3(a)(b), [1955] Il. Laws 1999 (repealed 1969), codified as
ch. 68, §52.
29. Id. After the 1955 amendment, section 52 contained seven subsections, only the first
five of which are relevant to parental child support duties. Subsections (a), (c) and (d)
stated that parents were severally liable for support of their children. Subsection (b) dealt
with the mother's obligation and imposed child support duties on her when the father was
dead, could not be found, or was incapable of providing support. Subsection (e) specifi-
cally stated that a divorced father was liable for the support of any dependent child of
the marriage. Although the 1955 amendments made substantial changes in section 52, the
relevant portions of subsections (b) and (e) were not altered. See Law of July 25, 1949,
§3(b)(d), [1949] Il. Laws 1193 (repealed 1969).
The court failed to note that section 52 was in force when the Plant separate mainte-
nance decree was entered in 1967. See note 8 supra. From then until section 52 was
repealed in 1969, the relative parental support duties, as imposed by statute, were primary
19761
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Despite the citations in Plant and Hursh, there are currently no Illi-
nois statutes dealing with the allocation of parental support duties.3"
The legislature has either not considered the question, or has not been
moved to enact its judgment on the matter into positive law.1 Thus, the
allocation of the relative parental support duties has been left to the
judiciary.2 The Plant and Hursh courts apparently realized this, for
both sought guidance from case law, in addition to the statutes.
3
Both courts relied heavily upon Purity Baking Co. v. Industrial
Commission.3 4 In that case, the issue before the Illinois Supreme Court
was whether, for the purpose of awarding death benefits under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, 35 a mother had a legal obligation to sup-
port her minor child. In holding that the mother was so obligated, the
supreme court discussed changes in the legal status of mothers. It also
said that "since the wife has become emancipated and now possesses the
full enjoyment of her property and earnings there is no longer any reason
why she should not be held legally responsible for the support of her
and secondary. The citation to parts of section 52 not only failed to support the conclusion
of joint and several parental obligations, it also ignored the express statutory imposition
of the primary/secondary distinction during part of the period for which the mother was
seeking recovery. This does not mean, however, that the Plant court's ultimate denial of
the retroactive support request was erroneous. Applying the primary/secondary distinc-
tion to the facts in Plant, the court would probably have concluded that the father was
incapable of providing the child's support during the period in question, thus obligating
the mother to do so.
30. See current statutes cited in notes 13, 14, 23, and 27 supra.
31. Indeed, the last time the legislature definitely considered parental support duties
was in 1955, when it amended section 52. See note 29 supra. The 1969 repeal of that section
was an equivocal act at best. The entire statute of which it was a part was repealed to
make way for a new Uniform Act. See note 4 supra. In doing so, it is possible that the
legislature consciously intended to abandon the primary/secondary distinction. It is
equally possible, however, that the legislature was concerned only with enacting a statute
which appeared to provide a better procedure for interstate enforcement of support de-
crees. It may have given no thought to whether a specific section of the old act, about to
be repealed, served any function not covered in the new act.
32. The legislature has, however, directed the courts to make proper provisions for the
children in all divorce cases. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §19 (1975). While it is possible
that this could be done on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, the results would be more
understandable and consistent if there were general guidelines on such matters as appor-
tionment of child support duties between the divorced parents.
33. Neither opinion explained the courts' views on how the statutes and case law fit
together, although the Plant opinion stated that both modern case law and statutes
indicate that the common law rule is outmoded. 20 Ill.App.3d at 8, 312 N.E.2d at 850.
34. 334 Il. 586, 166 N.E. 33 (1929).
35. The current version of the statutory requirement at issue in Purity Baking is found
in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §138.7(a) (1975).
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minor children equally with her husband."3 Some authorities have in-
terpreted this broad statement as a general equalization of the support
duties of Illinois parents. 7 Both the Plant and Hursh courts relied upon
this broad statement in deciding the relative parental support obliga-
tions.3" Yet, Purity Baking did not involve allocating child support du-
ties between parents. It only dealt with the abstract support obligation
of a mother, in relation to a third party's obligations under the Work-
men's Compensation Act. As such, Purity Baking stands for the general
proposition that as between parents and third parties, parental duties
are equal. It had no effect upon the previously established primary/
secondary distinction in relative support duties.39 Therefore, Purity
Baking is not directly applicable to the issue raised in Plant and Hursh.
It would, however, furnish a useful analogy upon which the courts could
draw in allocating the relative parental support duties.'
Aside from the analogy which can be drawn from Purity Baking,
Harnois v. Harnois4" is the cited case most relevant to the issue in Plant
36. 334 Ill. at 588, 166 N.E. at 34.
37. See Clow v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 928, 930-31 (1943); 27 ARK. L. REV. 157, 159
(1973).
38. 20 Ill.App.3d at 9, 312 N.E.2d at 850; 26 Ill.App.3d at 950-51, 326 N.E.2d at 97.
39. For another writer who has argued in favor of this interpretation of Purity Baking,
see Rothe, Taxability of Parents on the Use of Trust Income by or for Their Children, 48
ILL. B.J. 438, 448-50 (1960). This view of Purity Baking is further supported by cases
decided thereafter. Although Hoover v. Hoover, 307 Ill.App. 590, 30 N.E.2d 940 (1st Dist.
1940), repeated the broad statement of Purity Baking, it was dicta. The issue was whether
an original alimony award included money for child support, and that issue was decided
by interpreting the language of the former decree. Girls Latin School v. Hart, 317 Ill.App.
382, 46 N.E.2d 118 (lst Dist. 1943), which contains the same type of equality language as
Purity Baking, was a suit by a third party to recover educational expenses from a mother.
The first case to actually consider the relative support obligations of parents was Kemp
v. Kemp, 332 Ill.App. 432, 75 N.E.2d 385 (lst Dist. 1947). In Kemp, the same court which
had decided Hoover, supra, and Girls Latin School, supra, expressly stated that the
primary support obligation rested upon the divorced father if he was able to provide for
his children. 332 Ill.App. at 435-36, 75 N.E.2d at 386. The Kemp court did not mention
Purity Baking, and relied on earlier cases establishing primary/secondary support duties.
Kemp can be harmonized with Purity Baking if the equal responsibility statement in
Purity Baking was only intended to apply to situations involving third parties.
40. Neither the Plant nor Hursh opinions indicate how the court was using the cases
cited. If the justices intended to draw an analogy between the support duties in Purity
Baking and those in the instant cases, they did not articulate that intent.
41. 10 Ill.App.3d 1062, 295 N.E.2d 511 (1st Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974).
Both Plant and Hursh cited this case. The only other case cited by both courts was
Edwards v. Edwards, 125 IlI.App.2d 91, 259 N.E.2d 820 (4th Dist. 1970), which states the
rule that the financial circumstances of both parents should be considered in fixing sup-
port awards. As discussed in notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra, that requirement
has no effect on the allocation of relative parental support duties. Other cases cited in
19761
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and Hursh. In Harnois, the First District Appellate Court modified a
child support order with the effect that the parents, who had similar
incomes, were each obligated to contribute one-half of their daughter's
college expenses.42 In so doing, the court dealt only with the facts of the
case and did not attempt to explain the theory used to reach its deci-
sion.4"
Harnois was an important step in the development of the law govern-
ing child support obligations in Illinois because it indicated the willing-
ness of one court to treat one set of similarly situated parents equally.
Nevertheless, holding that one particular set of parents should bear
equal child support obligations is not the same as establishing a general
rule that all parents are jointly and severally liable for the support of
their children, with contributions based upon ability. There is a sub-
stantive change in emphasis when the courts establish a new rule of law.
Plant and Hursh did indeed establish a new rule, but neither court
acknowledged that it had moved beyond the previous law.
This lack of clear articulation in the courts' reasoning and analysis
is not the only problem presented by Plant and Hursh. Neither court
completely laid to rest the primary/secondary distinction in parental
support duties." For instance, Plant contains language which could be
Plant but not Hursh are: Everett v. Everett, 25 Ill.2d 342, 185 N.E.2d 201 (1962) (same
holding as Edwards, supra); In re Estate of Weisskopf, 39 Ill.App.2d 380, 188 N.E.2d 726
(1st Dist. 1963) (decided during the period in which the 1955 version of section 52 was in
effect, stated the primary/secondary distinction rule and held mother personally liable for
support when father was dead). Additional citations in Hursh were to Plant and two cases
stating the rule that there must be a change in circumstances before a child support order
can be modified. Metcoff v. Metcoff, 4 Ill.App.3d 160, 280 N.E.2d 572 (1st Dist. 1972);
Loucks v. Loucks, 130 Ill.App.2d 961, 266 N.E.2d 924 (5th Dist. 1971).
42. The trial court had ordered each parent to contribute one-half of the expenses, but
placed a limit of $1,000 on the father's obligation. The appellate court removed the
limitation, stating that the financial circumstances of the parents (mother's income
$15,900, father's $14,700) were not so different as to justify a limitation on the obligations
of one and not the other. 10 Ill.App.3d at 1068, 295 N.E.2d at 515.
43. The only authority cited by the Harnois court was ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, §19 (1969),
which was essentially similar to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, §19 (1975), discussed in notes 13
and 19-22 and accompanying text supra. Hursh, which was decided by two of the same
justices who had decided Harnois, explained the former decision as one in which "this
court approved the concept that parents with equal earning capacities should contribute
equally to a child's education." 26 Ill.App.3d at 951, 326 N.E.2d at 98.
44. The Plant court characterized the traditional support rules as "outmoded," 20
Ill.App.3d at 8, 312 N.E.2d at 850, but did not specifically attempt to overrule the early
cases which established the rules. This may be partly due to the fact that the earliest cases
were Illinois Supreme Court decisions. See note 4 supra. Because the Hursh court deter-
mined that the cited statutes were "[clontrary to the common law and some ancient case
law," 26 Ill.App.3d at 950, 326 N.E.2d at 97, it did not discuss the matter any further. As
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used to perpetuate the common law rule in some cases.45 In addition, the
terms chosen to describe the new parental obligations might be confus-
ing. "Joint and several" is a phrase normally used to describe contrac-
tual obligations involving third parties, not parental support duties." In
the context of relative parental support obligations, many of the tradi-
tional connotations of the term are not applicable to contributions based
upon ability to pay." If the phrase is retained, its special meaning in'
the area of child support obligations may need further explication.48
The most important defect in the Plant and Hursh opinions is the
discussed in notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra, the statutes are compatible with
either primary/secondary or joint and several parental support obligations.
45. The court began its analysis by stating "[Wie do not entirely agree with appel-
lant's argument that in every case the father is primarily responsible for such support."
20 Ill.App.3d at 7, 312 N.E.2d at 849. What the court probably meant is that in some cases
the father will bear the principal support obligation because of his superior financial
capability. Unfortunately, however, the court's language might be interpreted to mean
that the traditional rule is still applicable in some instances; the rule enunciated in Plant
and Hursh might apply only to similar factual situations. The Plant and Hursh courts
may not accept such a limitation, but the other districts in Illinois have not considered
the question. In Needland v. Needland, 17 Ill.App.3d 803, 308 N.E.2d 651 (3d Dist. 1974),
the Third District refused to consider a father's arguments in favor of equal parental
support obligations because the record did not establish the mother's ability to contribute.
The opinion gives no indication of how the court will rule on the issue when such ability
is shown. As recently as 1970, the Second District stated in passing that the mother had
"no duty to share" the burden of supporting the children. Webb v. Webb, 130 Ill.App.2d
618, 622, 264 N.E.2d 594, 597 (2d Dist. 1970).
46. "A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may sue one or more of
the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together at his option." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 972 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). The secondary definition also refers to "bond or note,"
"obligors," "obligee or payee," and "the creditor." Although obligor/obligee language is
used in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, see ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 68, §§101-42 (1975), the drafters of the Uniform Act specifically stated that support
duties are to be determined by state law. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1968 Rev. Act).
47. Between the parents themselves, if circumstances are such that one parent should
assume the entire support obligation, the other parent's liability would be zero, not the
total amount. In other circumstances, the liabilities would be proportional and neither
parent would be individually liable for the entire amount. When third parties such as
creditors seek to enforce parental obligations, however, joint and several is an adequate
description. The third party should. be able to recover from either or both parents if
necessary and should have the same duties as to both. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §15
(1975); Purity Baking Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 334 Ill. 586, 166 N.E. 33 (1929).
48. There is an alternative term which does not require the theoretical distinctions of
"joint and several." The obligations can be described as "equal," with contributions
according to ability. This is the description recently chosen by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court when it overturned the traditional rules. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d
324 (1974).
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failure of both courts to clearly articulate their reasoning and provide a
sound analysis in support of the results reached. In spite of this failure,
both opinions leave the reader with the overall impression that justice
was done. This is true as to the general rule stated, as well as to the
specific facts involved in each case.4" For that reason, the next portion
of the Comment will attempt to further articulate a theoretical basis for
joint and several parental support obligations, with contributions ac-
cording to ability.
ARTICULATION OF THE BASIS
Both the statutes and recent case law must be examined to determine
if the issue of relative parental support obligations has previously been
decided. Once the court 0 determines that there is no recent law directly
on point,51 it is left with the primary/secondary distinction developed at
common law. The original rationale supporting the rule, the common
law legal disabilities of married women, no longer exists to justify pre-
serving it. 2 Other rules which arose from the same common law disabili-
ties of married women have been abandoned. 3 In this context, it is
49. In Plant, the father will contribute future support monies. See note 8 supra.
Although the mother was forced to bear the entire support obligation for several years,
she was clearly the only parent with ability to do so at the time. Allowing a recovery of
the past support expenses would have significantly depleted the estate available for Mr.
Plant's care and maintenance and hastened his placement on welfare. 20 Ill.App.3d at 10,
312 N.E.2d at 851. The court's resolution gives ample consideration to the needs of all
involved, including mother, father and child.
The final result in Hursh is unknown at this point. However, a hearing at which the
assets and abilities of each parent are considered should result in the non-custodial mother
being ordered to contribute future support monies. This is especially so in light of her
superior earnings. See note 10 supra.
50. In this section, "the court" is used as a generic term, referring to any Illinois court
which considers the issue, unless the context indicates otherwise.
51. See discussion of statutes in notes 18-31 and accompanying text supra and of case
law in notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
52. In Purity Baking, the Illinois Supreme Court noted this basis for the pri-
mary/secondary parental support obligations. In overturning that rule insofar as third
parties were concerned, the court stated that the principal reason for it no longer existed.
334 Ill. at 588, 166 N.E. at 34. England has also recognized this fact and abandoned the
common law rules in favor of a joint support obligation. United Nations Commission on
the Status of Women, Parental Rights and Duties, Including Guardianship, supra note 3,
at 51. See also P. BROMILEY, FAMILY LAW 266-67, 462-77 (4th ed. 1971).
53. See, e.g., Guardians & Wards, Law of April 18, 1901, §4, [19011 Ill. Laws 216,
amending Guardians & Wards, Law of June 25, 1883, §4, [1883] Ill. Laws 100 (the father's
superior right to custody of a minor). This provision is now codified in ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
3, §132 (1975). Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)-overturned the
common law rule that only a husband could sue for loss of consortium.
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particularly appropriate for the court to reevaluate the common law
allocation of support duties in light of present day realities.5
Another state court which has recently considered relative parental
support obligations described the primary/secondary distinction as "a
fiction that the father is necessarily the best provider and that the
mother is incapable, because of her sex, of offering a contribution to the
fulfillment of this aspect of the parental obligation."55 As evaluated by
the realities of the 1970's, the "fiction" and the primary/secondary dis-
tinction suffer from the twin faults of overinclusiveness and underinclu-
siveness. 51 Fathers who are financially unable to support their children
are included in the class of those primarily liable, while mothers who
are financially able are excluded from it.57 In addition, the traditional
primary/secondary distinction does not recognize the modem trend to-
ward equalizing the rights and responsibilities of men and women in the
United States. 51
By preserving a rule which embodies a broad assumption of a
mother's incapacity to support her children, a court would be doing
54. In Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d at 429, 170 N.E.2d at 892, the Illinois Supreme Court
specifically recognized the propriety of such reevaluation by the courts. See also B. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 151 (1921).
55. Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 540, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974).
56. These terms are used throughout this section for convenience in the analysis. The
concept may also be described by saying the classification overreaches or underreaches.
See Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385, 387
(1976). Illinois courts, however, have not adopted any of these terms, but prefer to deal
with the same legal arguments in terms of reasonableness. Cf. Cessna v. Montgomery, 63
Ill.2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976).
57. Despite this fact, the best argument for preserving the traditional support duties
is probably economic. In 1973 the trend toward increasing disparity in the median wages
of fully employed men and women continued, with women earning only 56.6% of the wages
earned by the comparable group of men. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS
ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S BUREAU, The Earnings Gap, Table 1 (March 1975). The pur-
ported economic justification for the primary/secondary distinction is unconvincing for
two reasons. First, the rule is inflexible and fails to allow for the growing number of
families in which the mother's earnings may equal or exceed those of the father. Second,
the argument assumes that the child support rules are the result of the economic condi-
tions of society, not contributing causes of those conditions. Women in the labor force still
encounter opinions that they are working only for pocket money. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WOMEN'S BUREAU, The Myth and the Reality 1
(Rev. May 1974).
58. See, e.g., Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1970); Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1691-1691(e) (Supp. IV, 1974). Article I, §18 of the Illinois Consti-
tution, set out in note 64 infra, can also be viewed as an expression of current societal
values in favor of equalizing rights and obligations. However, this Note will deal with it
as a separate basis for the decisions. See notes 64-78 and accompanying text infra.
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more than failing to heed the presently available economic and social
data."9 It would also be ignoring and demeaning the contributions which
mothers have made to the support of their families in the past and which
many are making today. 0 In the context of a divorce or separation, a
custodial mother's contributions may be especially significant because
the child support order entered against the father often provides inade-
quate monies"' or is ignored by him. 2
After acknowledging that the statutes and prior cases did not cover
the point, the court could explicitly refer to these social and economic
factors for assistance in determining what the law governing relative
parental support duties should be. This method would lead to the same
conclusion reached by the Plant and Hursh courts,13 but the opinion
59. The following recent data is collected in NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR
CHILDREN AND YOUTH, AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1976: A BICENTENNIAL ASSESSMENT (1976), from
the U.S. government publications cited therein. In 1975, over 2.6 million women who
headed families were in the labor force. Id. at 55. Altogether, 14 million mothers, or 47%
of all women with children under 18, were in the labor force. Id. at 53. 27.6 million
children, 44% of all children under 18, had mothers in the labor force. Id. at 54. Most
mothers work for financial reasons. Id. at 57. In husband-wife families, working wives
account for 26% of the family income. Id.
60. In the context of Social Security benefits, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the impermissibility and impropriety of denigrating women's efforts:
Obviously, the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary
supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical sup-
port. . . . But such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the
denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute
significantly to their families' support.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
61. In a nationwide survey, judges noted that the support orders they entered were
often inadequate because of other financial or family obligations or limited earnings of the
father. Quenstedt & Winkler, What Are Our Domestic Relations Judges Thinking? ABA
FAMILY LAW SECTION, Monograph No. 1 (1965). See also comments by David Linn, Asso-
ciate Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, reported in Gorner, Judges Become
Accountants in Disputes over Payments, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 23, 1975, §3, at 2, col. 4.
62. A study in Wisconsin reported that after one year only 38% of the fathers were in
full compliance, while 42% were in total noncompliance, i.e., they paid nothing. By the
tenth year compliance had dropped to 13% and total noncompliance had risen to 79%.
Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 189-92 (1971), reporting
and commenting on material previously published in Eckhardt, Deviance, Visibility, and
Legal Action: The Duty to Support, 15 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 470 (1968).
There is some evidence that nonpayment is willful, and simply a result of lack of
enforcement. When Los Angeles County, California, made a concerted effort to collect
support payments during the month of December, 1971, a total of 557 fathers who were
cited for nonpayment thereafter paid an additional $1,000,000. M. WINSTON & T. FORSHER,
NONSUPPORT OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN BY AFFLUENT FATHERS AS A CAUSE OF POVERTY AND
WELFARE DEPENDENCE 21 (Rand Corp. Paper P-4665, Rev. 1974).
63. For a slightly different choice of terms to describe the parental obligations, see
note 48 supra.
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would better articulate and explain the reasons for the new rule. In
addition, explicit consideration of the factors supporting the appropri-
ateness of joint and several obligations in today's society would facilitate
reevaluation, if necessary, in the future.
Although the foregoing analysis would be especially appealing to a
court concerned with social justice as well as logic, it is not the only
theoretical basis upon which an Illinois court could determine that both
parents are obligated to support their children to the best of their re-
spective abilities. Article I, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution 4 pro-
vides an independent and alternative basis for such a result. Pursuant
to this equal protection provision, the Illinois Supreme Court has held
that classifications based on sex are "suspect" in Illinois; 5 they must
withstand "strict judicial scrutiny" to be upheld. 8
The first step in the court's equal protection analysis would be to
decide if the traditional classification of the father's support duty as
primary, and the mother's as secondary, is based on sex.87 The basic
group whose support obligations are at issue is composed of all parents
of either sex. The traditional rule uses the terms "mother" and "fa-
ther" to divide this group of parents into two sex-specific subgroups.
64. "The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts." ILL. CONST. art. I,
§18.
65. People v. Ellis, 57 lll.2d 120, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
66. Id. at 132-33, 311 N.E.2d at 101.
67. The analysis herein is structured for a challenge to the primary/secondary distinc-
tion on its face, rather than as applied. Finding the traditional rule invalid as applied to
a particular person would not lead to abandonment of it in favor of the joint and several
obligation established in Plant and Hursh.
It should be noted that the father in Hursh did raise an equal protection argument
under both the federal and state constitutions. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 7, Reply
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 23, Hursh v. Hursh, 26 Ill.App.3d 947, 326 N.E.2d 95
(1st Dist. 1975). Unfortunately, the argument was not well-developed, and it is difficult
to tell whether it was intended as a challenge to the rule on its face or as applied. The
mother's brief argued that sex discrimination was not the true issue in the case and,
further, that the trial court had not discriminated against the father. Brief for Plaintiff-
Respondent at 13-15. The Hursh court did not discuss the constitutional issue on either
level. The court's only reference to it appeared at the end of the opinion, which stated
that the trial court's failure to consider the circumstances of all parties "was an abuse of
discretion, denying the defendant [father] the equal protection of the laws of this state."
26 Ill.App.3d at 952, 326 N.E.2d at 99.
The common law basis of the primary/secondary distinction will present no particular
problems to the analysis. Common law rules, as well as statutes, can deny the equal
protection of the laws. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (common law rule
giving only legitimate children a right to support from their natural fathers held a denial
of equal protection to illegitimate children).
19761
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Then the support function is apportioned between the parents on the
basis of the subgroup to which each has been assigned. This is done
without regard to the fact that either parent may be able to adequately
perform the support function, regardless of his or her sex.s The classi-
fication of parental duties is, therefore, not based upon the nature of the
function to be performed 9 or actual ability, but upon the sex of the
parent.
Once the court has determined that the classification is based on sex,
it must consider whether there is any compelling state interest which
justifies maintaining the distinction in support duties. The important
state interest involved is insuring that children are adequately sup-
ported by someone other than the state.7 The logical and legislative
68. See note 59 supra.
69. The significance of a classification based on function is suggested by Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), which held that it is constitutionally permissible to exclude
normal pregnancy from the conditions covered under a state disability insurance program.
The Supreme Court noted that although only women can become pregnant, the condition
was an objectively identifiable one with unique characteristics. Id. at 496 n.20. This
suggests that, at least under a standard of review which is less than "strict scrutiny," it
is permissible to treat a sexually unique condition or function in a unique manner. Ability
to support a child, however, is not such a function.
Therefore, the primary/secondary distinction in support duties might even be subject
to an equal protection attack in a state which has not declared sex a suspect classification.
Such a challenge was launched against a Missouri version of the primary/secondary dis-
tinction, in which the assets of the mother need not have been considered and no support
order could have been entered against a mother. Williams v. Williams, 510 S.W.2d 452
(Mo. 1974). However, the court refused to consider the constitutional issue because the
statutes had recently been amended to remove the alleged defects, even though the pri-
mary obligation of the father was expressly retained. See note 22 supra. Although the
relative parental support duties in each state are unique, Nebraska apparently follows the
rule that the father's obligation is primary, regardless of the mother's assets. See Schnei-
der v. Schneider, 188 Neb. 80, 195 NW.2d 227 (1972). This version of the traditional rule
appears to be more susceptible to an equal protection attack than a rule under which the
assets of both parents are at least considered. But see Dill v. Dill, 232 Ga. 231, 206 S.E.2d
6 (1974), rejecting a father's due process and equal protection challenges to a Georgia
codification of the primary/secondary distinction and finding a "fair and substantial"
relation between the statutory provisions and the object of the legislation. The Dill court's
finding was predicated on the existence of moral, social, economic and physical differences
between the sexes, said to divide them into natural classes and justify different treatment.
Id. at 233, 206 S.E.2d at 7, citing a prior opinion which relied on 24 AM. JUR.2d Divorce
& Separation §21 (1966).
70. The interest in reducing the amount of monies needed for AFDC payments, by
obtaining adequate parental support in lieu thereof, was repeatedly emphasized by mem-
bers of Congress before the adoption of the recent federal child support legislation, 42
U.S.C. §§651-60 (Supp. IV, 1974). See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-156, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprinted at 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 8133. The state of Illinois undoubtedly
has a similar interest in requiring private parties to support their children, thereby avoid-
ing the need to use state monies for that purpose.
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choice of persons to discharge that support duty is parents.7 The court's
next inquiry would be directed to whether there is any compelling reason
to divide the group into sex-specific subgroups with different obliga-
tions. An economic argument based on the generally superior earnings
of males can be raised.72 However, it is simply not compelling." The rule
creates a group of parents primarily liable for support, but does not in
any way assure that those included in the group have ability to dis-
charge the obligation imposed upon them. The state's goal of securing
support is not effectively served by the classification scheme because it
is both underinclusive and overinclusive in regard to the goal." Upon
examination, the sex-based primary/secondary distinction in parental
duties appears to be a mere administrative convenience employed to
avoid determining which parent is able, or most able, to provide the
needed support."
Since the primary/secondary distinction is not justified by any com-
pelling state interest, it would deny the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by Article I, section 18, of the Illinois Constitution." The
only further question before the court would be allocation of parental
71. See statutes cited in notes 13, 14, 23 and 27 supra. The choice of parents as the
group to bear the support obligation does not have to serve a "compelling state interest"
because it is not based on a suspect classification and does not infringe any fundamental
interest.
72. See note 57 supra.
73. Neither is the distinction in relative parental support duties "remedial" in na-
ture, as was the property tax exemption upheld in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974),
discussed in Note, Tax Benefits for Widows, The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Rem-
edial Sex Legislation-Kahn v. Shevin, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 797 (1975). First, the distinc-
tion is not a product of statute, but of common law. Second, even if one assumes that there
can be such a thing as "remedial" common law, the long history of the provision negates
the argument of remedial intent. It developed as part of the common law system in which
discrimination against women and mothers was rampant. The mere fact that the rule has
persisted longer than some of the other rules developed at common law does not suddenly
endow it with the purpose of cushioning the impact of economic discrimination against
women. Research discloses no court opinion which has ever attempted to justify the
distinction on such a basis.
74. See note 56 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note 57 supra.
75. Even the United States Supreme Court, which has never declared sex a suspect
classification under the United States Constitution, and thus does not require a compel-
ling state interest to justify sex-based classifications, has struck them down when they
appear to be mere administrative conveniences. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (statutory presumption of a wife's dependency on her serviceman husband, but no
similar presumption in favor of husbands of servicewomen); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (statutory presumption giving male relatives priority over females in the same
priority class when appointing administrators of estates).
76. See note 64 supra.
19761
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:707
support duties in view of that finding. Because the rule is derived from
common law, not statute," the court will not be faced with deciding
whether invalidation or extension is proper."5 The court would be able
to strike down the primary/secondary distinction in its entirety and
replace it with a rule for the allocation of child support duties which
does not discriminate on the basis of sex.
BEYOND Plant AND Hursh
Even with an adequately articulated theoretical basis for joint and
several parental child support obligations, there are at least two ques-
tions regarding the scope and content of the new parental duties which
Plant and Hursh do not explicitly resolve. First, the opinions leave
unanswered the question of whether married, as well as divorced and
separated parents, are jointly and severally obligated to support their
children. The extension involved seems reasonable."5 If the pri-
mary/secondary distinction does not comport with the realities of the
1970's and denies equal protection of the laws, it suffers from these
faults regardless of the parents' marital status. Therefore, all parents in
Illinois should be jointly and severally obligated to support their chil-
dren to the best of their ability. 0
77. See notes 18-32 and accompanying text supra.
78. For a brief discussion of the factors which courts have considered in deciding the
invalidation/extension question see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 913-
20 (1971). So far as the primary/secondary distinction in support duties is concerned, the
invalidation/extension question would present several theoretical difficulties if it had to
be resolved. First, if the distinction is viewed as imposing a detriment upon fathers,
invalidation would be the logical result. However, this would leave each parent with the
secondary obligation formerly imposed only upon mothers, and no primary obligor. View-
ing the distinction as a benefit to mothers and extending it to fathers would also leave no
primary obligor. A third possibility is to view the distinction as imposing a detriment on
children by depriving them of full support from both parents. This view would seem to
require extension of the father's primary duty to include the mother, thus giving two
primary obligors and no secondary obligor, unless one is chosen from among other rela-
tives. However, no Illinois statute imposes support duties on any relatives other than
parents or spouses. See statutes cited in notes 13, 14, 23 and 27 supra. Rather than involve
itself in these analytical difficulties, a court would be well-advised to abandon the pri-
mary/secondary language in favor of some other terminology to describe parental obliga-
tions.
79. It can be argued that Plant provides authority for holding married parents jointly
and severally liable for support because the court made no particular attempt to limit its
holding to separated parents. See 20 Ill.App.3d at 7-8, 312 N.E.2d at 849-50. The Hursh
court, however, did limit its holding to divorced parents. See 26 Ill.App.3d at 951, 326
N.E.2d at 98.
80. However, the probability of a court specifically holding that married parents bear
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The second question is whether this new obligation requires each
parent to make a monetary contribution to his or her child's support.
So far as married parents are concerned, the courts and society will
undoubtedly allow them to continue making their own decisions regard-
ing finances and division of labor.8 The courts, however, will have to
make these decisions for broken families. In doing so, they should be
guided by the language in both Plant and Hursh which emphasizes the
need to consider the facts and circumstances of each individual case.2
The variations in factual situations are, of course, almost endless, and
the circumstances in each case may also change over time. 3 Therefore,
it may be impossible to establish any general rules regarding monetary
contributions. Nevertheless, there should be some circumstances in
which a parent will not be required to make a monetary contribution.
An unemployed parent with no assets is one possible example. 4 Like-
wise, the parent with no marketable skills might be exempted from
making a monetary contribution to support. 5 In some cases a contribu-
a joint and several civil support obligation is extremely low. Unless there are violations of
the criminal law, a court will normally refuse to intervene in the internal affairs of families
which remain together. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336
(1953), in which the court denied a wife's request for money and other facilities well within
her husband's means because she continued to live with him.
The legislature could adopt a statute declaring the joint and several duty of all
parents to support their children. However, due to the policy of nonintervention, the only
effect of such a civil statute would be upon society's traditional stereotyped conceptions
about women and their proper place in the world. That in itself might be a legislative goal
worth pursuing. Cf. Note, supra note 73, at 807; Note, "A Little Deare, than His Horse,"
Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV.
260 (1971); Note, Teaching Woman Her Place: The Role of Public Education in the
Development of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINcs L.J. 1191 (1973).
81. See note 79 supra on the policy of nonintervention.
82. 20 Ill.App.3d at 7-8, 312 N.E.2d at 849; 26 Ill.App.3d at 950-51, 326 N.E.2d at
97-98.
83. It is for this reason that child support orders are modifiable. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 40, §19 (1975).
84. This group would include parents such as Mr. Plant before his inheritance. See
note 8 supra. After the inheritance, however, Mr. Plant had assets and would no longer
be within this category. Such a parent could legitimately be required to make some
contribution to support, as was Mr. Plant.
It is also necessary to recognize that some unscrupulous parents might attempt to
qualify for the "protection" which this category provides to those without ability to make
a monetary contribution. Thus, the courts will need to be wary of possible abuses asso-
ciated with claimed inability. See, e.g., Pencovic v. Pencovic, 45 Cal.2d 97, 287 P.2d 501
(1955), in which a father was spiritual head of a religious society which prohibited outside
employment but which financed trips abroad, paid his gambling debts, and had paid his
child support obligations in the past.
85. This category could include persons such as a mother who was over 45 and had
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tion in the form of services might be acceptable in lieu of money." If the
courts of Illinois give careful attention to the facts of each case, there
will be no absolute rule demanding that both separated parents make a
monetary contribution to their child's support.
This result is consistent with the goal hopefully served by the joint
and several parental support obligations created by Plant and Hursh.
The new conception of parental duties, as further articulated herein,
should enable the Illinois courts to adequately consider and protect the
individual and legitimate interests of both mother and father, while still
providing needed child support monies.
Lee Ann Conti
never worked outside the home. A 25 year old, however, might legitimately be expected
to acquire marketable skills within a reasonable period of time.
86. This might be especially appropriate in cases which involve pre-school children.
There is a significant body of expert opinion stating that the quality of care and attention
which an infant receives will profoundly affect his or her later growth and development.
See, e.g., B.L. WHITE. THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF LIFE (1975). Another group which could
be included are custodial parents whose potential net earnings are so low that the costs
of adequate substitute care would equal or exceed the potential earnings.
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